In the presence of security countermeasures, a malware designed for data exfiltration must do so using a covert channel to achieve its goal. Among existing covert channels stands the domain name system (DNS) protocol. Although the detection of covert channels over the DNS has been thoroughly studied in the last decade, previous research dealt with a specific subclass of covert channels, namely DNS tunneling. While the importance of tunneling detection is not undermined, an entire class of low throughput DNS exfiltration malware remained overlooked. The goal of this study is to propose a method for detecting both tunneling and low-throughput data exfiltration over the DNS. Towards this end, we propose a solution composed of a supervised feature selection method, and an interchangeable, and adjustable anomaly detection model trained on legitimate traffic. In the first step, a one-class classifier is applied for detecting domain-specific traffic that does not conform with the normal behavior. Then, in the second step, in order to reduce the false positive rate resulting from the attempt to detect the low-throughput data exfiltration we apply a rule-based filter that filters data exchange over DNS used by legitimate services. Our solution was evaluated on a mediumscale recursive DNS server logs, and involved more than 75,000 legitimate uses and almost 2,000 attacks. Evaluation results shows that while DNS tunneling is covered with at least 99% recall rate and less than 0.01% false positive rate, the detection of low throughput exfiltration is more difficult. While not preventing it completely, our solution limits a malware attempting to avoid detection with at most a 1kb/h of payload under the limitations of the DNS syntax (equivalent to five credit cards details, or ten user credentials per hour) which reduces the effectiveness of the attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal computers and computer networks have been the targets of data theft attacks using common techniques which may involve man-in-the-middle attacks [8] , or a malware leaking data over a covert channel [24] , [37] . In the case of a malware, usually, a remote server, which acts as a command and control (C2), waits for communications from the malware and logs the data transferred to it. However, in protected networks (private or organizational) the targeted hosts can reside in a restricted segment with limited access to/from the outside world. In such cases, even if connections are allowed, they are typically monitored by security solutions for suspicious behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to find a covert channel for the exfiltration of data to the remote server without being blocked or detected by the implemented security solutions. One channel used for achieving this goal, which is the focus of this study, is the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol [26] .
Any communication from local computers to the Internet (excluding static-IP based communications) relies on the DNS service. For that reason restricting the DNS communication may result in legitimate remote services dis-connectivity and therefore, security policy is often less enforced on the DNS protocol. This makes the DNS protocol a good candidate for covert channels [4] .
Typically, the DNS protocol was not designed for arbitrary data exchange; the DNS messages are relatively short and responses are uncorrelated which means that they do not necessarily arrive at the order the corresponding requests were sent [25] . Based on that behavior, we define two classes of DNS covert channels: (1) high-throughput tunneling used for establishing a general bidirectional communication channel over DNS (i.e., maintaining TCP session between the malware and the C2 server); and (2) low-throughput malware communication used mainly as a unidirectional channel for the exfiltration of minimal amount of data (e.g., credit cards numbers, user credentials, key-logging and geographical locations).
The problem of detecting covert channels over DNS had been widely studied in the last decade [6] , [7] , [11] , [15] , [18] , [34] , [35] . However, to the best of our knowledge, previous works mainly focused on detecting the DNS tunneling attack class. While the case of DNS tunneling is important, pursuing its unique characteristics, i.e., bi-directionality data exchange and high throughput, may degrade the ability of the proposed methods to detect the low-throughput malware communication attack class. Our survey indicates that there are at least ten known malware families using DNS exfiltration that have been overlooked almost entirely. These low-throughput exfiltration malware were part of large cyber campaigns in recent years [19] , [30] .
One of the challenges in detecting malicious data exfiltration over DNS traffic is due to the fact that multiple legitimate services are also using the DNS protocol for data exchange; for example anti-virus and security companies that perform signature lookup over the DNS. This behavior is more similar to the low-throughput malware communication cases and therefore was overlooked by previous studies.
In this work we propose a novel approach to detecting DNS exfiltration -focusing on both DNS tunneling and lowthroughput data exfiltration. In the proposed method we train a one-class classifier using a set of legitimate (benign) DNS arXiv:1709.08395v1 [cs.CR] 25 Sep 2017 requests. The features that are extracted from the DNS requests are carefully selected in order to assist the classifier in the detection of not only DNS tunneling but also low-throughput data exfiltration attacks. In the first step of the detection phase, the one-class classifier is applied for detecting domainspecific traffic that do not conform with the normal behavior. Then, in the second step, in order to reduce the false positive rate resulting from the attempt to detect the low-throughput data exfiltration we apply a rule-based filter that filters out anomalous channels with a sufficiently good reputation (i.e., data exchange over DNS used by legitimate services). The remaining unfiltered channels will be marked as malicious indefinitely.
The contribution of our work is two-fold. First, we present a set of features, carefully selected by applying a supervised process, that are optimal for the detection of low throughput exfiltration channels. Second, based on the selected features, we present a two-step process for the detection of the two data exfiltration classes. The system relies on DNS logs, fortified with freely available data sources to filter out legitimate data exchange services.
We evaluate our method using an active medium-scale DNS system on which we executed actual attacks (i.e., existing malware in the wild) as well as simulated credit-card exfiltration attacks. The evaluation dataset includes more than 75,000 normal primary domain and almost 2,000 attacks. Two anomaly detection models are compared (isolation forests and one-class SVM), and the results indicate that high throughput DNS exfiltration (transmitting at least 10KB/h) is detected with 99% true positive rate (TPR) and less than 0.01% false positive rate (FPR). These attacks include all uses of DNS tunneling including: web page browsing, remote desktop execution and file transfer. Low throughput DNS exfiltration (approx. 1kb/h) is detected with 80% TPR and less than 1% of FPR. Under the assumption that passwords and credit cards will not be sent in the clear, encryption and encoding redundancies are required. The above mentioned throughput of 1kb/h is therefore equivalent to five credit cards details or ten user credentials per hour. This highly limits the effectiveness of an attack.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the scheme of data exchange over DNS, and its attributes. In addition, the use cases of data exchange over the DNS are classified to legitimate, high throughput tunneling, and low throughput malware to allow a proper evaluation of our solution. Section III reviews the current state of research in the field. Our proposed method and feature selection process are presented in Sections IV and V respectively. Section VI reviews the evaluation of our framework, and SectionVII concludes the paper and advises potential future works on the topic.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides the basics of DNS required for the paper. From a top-level perspective, the scheme for general misuse of the DNS for data exchange is explained. To allow a detailed discussion regarding previous research and the paper's focus, the background section ends with an introduction to legitimate data exchange over the DNS, as well as categorization of possible attacks (high throughput DNS tunneling and lowthroughput malware communication).
A. The DNS Protocol
The purpose of DNS is to provide information on domains listed in the domain registry lists. A data entry is called a resource record (RR), and it contains the entry name (rrname), type (rrtype), class, value (rrvalue) and time-to-live value. The most popular resource records' types are the ones used for the translation of domain names to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses: type A (IP version 4 address) and type AAAA (IP version 6 address) records. However, there are many types of information available, including CNAME records (aliases), MX records (pointing to mail servers for email delivery), TXT records (holding general information about the domain, 255 bytes long), and more.
The enormous number of domains and subdomains in the Internet today exceeds the storage capability of a small, simple database. This was foreseen by the designers of the DNS and the system was designed as a hierarchical distributed database. In general, there are many public suffixes (.com, .co.uk, .org), maintained by various authorities. Each domain can be resolved by an authoritative name servers (AuthNS) assigned to it by its public suffix. These name servers will hold the list of all subdomains under this domain. For example, if the domain login.example.com is queried, the DNS resolver will look for the AuthNS of example.com by querying the suffix .com. It will then query the AuthNS of example.com for the domain login.example.com and receive the answer (if it exists).
B. Data Exchange over DNS Scheme
The DNS is designed as a stateless protocol for exchanging very short and specific types of information. At no point was this protocol meant to carry information from the client to the server interactively. However, the AuthNS does indeed see the queries from the clients, and if they follow a certain pattern, the requested subdomain can be interpreted as data. For example, if the domain passw0rd.example.com was queried, the AuthNS for example.com effectively receives the string "passw0rd" and can interpret it as incoming data. Combined with the server's response, one can form a bidirectional interactive data channel (see general scheme in Figure 1 ). The caveat here is that the amount of information that can be exchanged in each message is limited by the length of allowed domain names, and the server is limited by the length of the RR value. Fig. 1 . A general scheme for data exchange over DNS. The figure presents an attack in which a user password hosted on a compromised machine is unwillingly sent to an attacker via a DNS query. As mentioned in the main text, this technique is used by legit services too.
C. Legitimate Data Exchange over the DNS
While data exchange over the DNS may seem like a misuse of the protocol, in that the DNS was not designed for this purpose, it is also performed by legitimate services. An example of such services are antivirus (AV) providers and other reputation-based services including: Sophos eXtensible List (sophosxl.net), McAfee (mcafee.com), and SpamHaus (spamhaus.org).
The presence of such services makes the challenge of detecting malicious data exfiltration attacks even more difficult.
D. Categorization of DNS Exfiltration Attacks
We categorize attacks by their throughput based on an existence of a session (i.e., a TCP session over the DNS will be regarded as high throughput). Such categorization is important, primarily for the purposes of evaluating and assessing detection capabilities against different types of attacks.
1) High-Throughput Tunneling:
The DNS tunneling techniques are used for establishing a general bidirectional communication channel over the DNS. DNS tunneling tools are readily available (see Table I ) and typically implement emulation of TCP over DNS. The use of these tools varies from remote shell execution to HTTP browsing. The main motivation for using such tools is mostly to avoid restricted Wi-Fi access where forced. However, it is possible to use this technique as a shell control channel when other alternatives are monitored and / or blocked.
Due to the limited size and unreliable nature of DNS queries, the use of such tools is often accompanied with constant keep-alive messages, lengthy and encoded sub-domains, as well as a high volume of traffic. The most commonly used DNS records types are A (IP version 4 address) and AAAA (IP version 6 address) records, which contain 4 and 16 bytes per record, respectively. Thus, such programs typically use less common DNS records, such as TXT (which can hold up to 255 bytes). Related work on data exfiltration over the DNS focuses on this family (see Section III) due to its popularity, and availability. The DNS tunneling technique can be used in many cases, both legitimate and malicious. However, since it enforces a TCP session over the domain name system, it results in a significant request overhead to the already narrow bandwidth.
2) Low-Throughput Malware Communication: In order to overcome a request size overhead and avoid detection, most malwares establish a sessionless messaging protocol over the DNS. Examples of such malware are presented in Table II . These malware also use DNS for data exchange, similarly to DNS tunneling. However, a minimal amount of data is exchanged in the operation of these malware which makes them more difficult to detect. In some of the cases, the channel is not even used for receiving commands, but only as a unidirectional channel for the exfiltration of data.
The payload delivered may vary and include credit cards numbers, user credentials, key-logging and geographical locations. To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has dealt with detection of such malware over the DNS communication. 
E. Analysis Approaches
When applying a security solution, different representations of the input data may affect the ability to detect the attacks as well as the trace-back ability (i.e., the capability to shutdown an attack based on an alert). In general, the detection of DNS exfiltration can be made by analyzing:
1) the DNS traffic as a whole; 2) user-specific traffic (e.g., requests made by John Doe); and 3) domain-specific traffic (e.g., requests to "*.example.com").
The vast majority of previous works on DNS exfiltration (presented in Section III) thus far has involved the first two methods. Indeed, the amount of traffic generated by an active tunneling channel over DNS is expected to generate enough traffic to stand out even inside the enormous amounts of data generated by a single user. However, in order to detect lowthroughput exfiltration channels, one needs to look at the data with a better resolution. Normally when analyzing access patterns over the DNS traffic, more domains are observed than users. To give an example, a commmon Internet Service Provider (ISP) traffic contains up to 1.5 million distinct users (IP addresses), and logs traffic up to six million unique domains per hour (including subdomains).
In addition to granularity, consumers of a security solution would require that upon an attack attempt -tracing back the malware should be an easy task. For that task, analyzing the whole DNS traffic, aggregated, (according to approach 1 above) is highly unsuitable and analyzing user-specific data (according to approach 2) may require sophisticated forensic tools. However, analyzing the domain-specific (approach 3) allows a simple scan of processes querying the domains within clients.
We rely on these observations to explore domain-specific traffic. In a sense, we look at each primary domain as a potential channel of data exchange. Based on this definition, classifying a channel as either covert or non-covert allows us to easily isolate the application responsible for data exfiltration, as opposed to only able to report its occurrence. Moreover and explained above, domain-specific traffic exploration improves the chances of a solution to detect low throughput malware exfiltration.
For the sake of generality, from here on out we refer to a domain-specific traffic as a channel.
F. Attack Attributes
Given the two types of data exfiltration attacks we wish to explore (see Section II-D), there are several types of behavioral patterns and features we extract on the inspected channels. The abnormality of a domain carrying out an attack can be described in terms of (1) time-based behavior, (2) outgoing queries, and (3) incoming responses (see Figure 2 ). These are described in greater detail below.
1) Time-Based Behavior: While sessionless attacks are not obligated to a time-related pattern, session-oriented communications (e.g., TCP tunneling over the DNS) are bounded to a short mean time between consecutive requests due to keepalives and session overhead.
2) Outbound Traffic: The normal use of DNS, based on what it was designed for, is the exchange of a hostname for an IP address. To that end, different end-users will tend to query the same resources. However, when used as a communication channel, outgoing requests are not likely to repeat themselves, follow a protocol structure, or be aided with encoding and / or encryption.
3) Inbound Traffic: Domain-specific traffic may encompass a large collection of queries, each of which may be resolved to a different IP address. Based on that, a two-sided communication channel is expected include non-repeating queries, as well as lengthy ("rich") answers. However, queries in a one-sided channel are expected to be answered in a laconic way (e.g., upon a successful password exfiltration, a constant IP address serve as an acknowledgment message). Since data exchange over the domain name system is a misuse of the protocol, it is likely behave differently than the normal hostname resolving use case. The list of attributes appearing above are useful for determining of whether a domain in the system is used for data exchange.
III. RELATED WORKS
To the best of our knowledge, research conducted thus far has focused on DNS tunneling tools and techniques. Lowthroughput malware communication over DNS as described in section II-D2 have not be addressed.
Previous works focus on specific DNS tunneling tools, mainly Iodine. Kara et al. [18] analyze the difference in distribution of TXT RR requests between popular domains and domains used for tunneling with Iodine. Later versions of Iodine leverage other types of rich resource records (e.g., SRV, NULL). Sheridan et al. [34] also focus on Iodine and rely on the fact that normal DNS usage will be followed by TCP communication to the resulting domain IPs. They analyze three scenarios: normal (no attack), passive Iodine, and active Iodine. They show a clear distinction in the amount of DNS requests versus TCP activity between the two scenarios.
Buczak et al. [6] also detect tunneling, although not only Iodine. The proposed method uses two different types of PCAP files: with and without tunneling, where the tunneling is performed by one of three tools. A supervised random forest classifier is used to distinguish the two classes.
Other works have leveraged anomaly detection to overcome the problems encountered in the above mentioned works. Cambiaso et al. [7] refer to the entire DNS communication as a whole and looks at sliding windows of requests and responses, extract features and then reduce dimensionality using Principle Component Analysis (PCA). Consecutive samples are compared using mutual information to detect slight changes (anomalies). A similar work [15] detects changes in Shannon entropy between consecutive time windows. Although these approaches deal well with the detection of several DNS tunneling tools they are lacking in two aspects: (1) low throughput exfiltration of data that does not go over TCP are unlikely to create a major change (or any change at all) in consecutive samples; (2) upon a successful alert of tunneling it is difficult to find the source of an anomaly due to both loss of data and the fact that there is no assignment of requests to a single session. Thus, from a consumer perspective on a large DNS traffic this might be an insufficient solution.
Another work of Engelstad et al [11] evaluates two anomaly detection techniques to detect tunneling over mobile DNS. Their findings show that OCSVM (one-class SVM) outperforms k-means in this scenario. While offering a generic detection approach for one-class anomaly detection, only two techniques were considered (clustering and distance).
McCarthy et al. [23] suggest a Markov decision process to infer what network nodes' sensors should be activated for the detection of DNS exfiltration. This is done interactively using a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) over the network graph where nodes correspond to hosts and edges to channels. While this model is theoretically able to cover all possible attacks, it is very complicated to implement and execute indefinitely on large amounts of data (the analysis was done using the DETER simulative testbed).
The difference between legitimate and malicious DNS tunneling is emphasized in Wang et al. [35] . In this work, Wang points out that the detection of tunneling is simple enough, since the volume of requests is high, however the distinction between types of tunneling is hard. He suggests a whitelist in the form of a legitimate tunneling directory in which reputable DNS tunneling services must register in advance and otherwise would be denied. This solution, if implemented, would decrease false positive rates for all other solutions. However, it is important to note that according to the features described in the paper, when "lowering the bar" in order to detect less signaling attacks there might be false positives which are not "pure"tunneling (e.g., advertisement blocking bypass solutions, and content delivery networks domains) that incorporate a high volume of requests together with high entropy. Such services would not consider registering as they are not tunneling. Therefore, while improving the situation, whitelist solutions are dependent upon implicit inference regarding whether an act of tunneling is malicious or not.
IV. METHOD

A. Overview
Our method is based on the notion of channels (i.e., domain-specific traffic), and aims to detect whether a channel is used for covert data exchange over the DNS. Periodically, available DNS logs are collected and aggregated by a domain name. After the collection of data, a detection process which is based on a set of selected features, and an interchangeable anomaly detection model is applied in order to detect covert channels. Moreover, to address the issue of legitimate covert channels (discussed in Section II-B), a rule-based filter is applied on an additional set of features related to the domain's reputation in order to eliminate legitimate covert channels. An overview of the entire process is available in Figure 3 . To that end, our proposed detection algorithm is composed of the following stages:
1) Data Collection: once an hour, all of the DNS traffic is aggregated using the primary domain key. Then the last N aggregations compose a single input sample space (i.e., each primary domain will appear once and its features will be based on the last N aggregations).
2) Feature Extraction: within a sliding window, collected data is combined and reduced to a set of vectors corresponding to channels with their set of selected features (see Section V).
3) Covert Channels Detection: an interchangeable anomaly detection model (one class classifier) is used to detect channels that do not conform to normal behavior with regards to extracted features.
4) Legitimate Channels
Removal: using a rule-based filter, anomalous channels with a sufficiently good reputation are filtered out. The remaining unfiltered channels will be marked as malicious indefinitely. The rules applied attempt to eliminate channels that exchange data but have an adequate reputation based on wide client usage and/or a high volume of HTTP requests (see Section II-B).
B. Parameters
The model has two parameters described in this section. Parameter setting should depend on the threat model and system performance capabilities. 1) Data collection sliding window size: Amount of consecutive hourly aggregation to summarize (also denoted as N ). Increasing N will allow dealing with a smaller throughput attacks while requiring additional computational resources based on the size of the window.
2) Contamination rate: The acceptable rate of false positive rate of the first phase. Setting a higher contamination rate will result in possible discovery of attacks with a lower throughput while increasing the false positive rate.
C. Data Collection
The main goal of the data collection phase is to generate a compact representation of domain-specific traffic that will allow an efficient feature extraction process later on. The process aggregates data on an hourly basis, and the next phase reduces its size using a sliding window approach.
Recursive DNS traffic logs may contain over a billion requests per hour. Therefore, analyzing several hours of data on demand may cause performance issues. To cope with this, we advise a summary of hourly data in a form that will not restrict the sliding window size. As recalled in Section II-E, aggregating on primary domains allows a compact representation of the regardless of the number of clients.
D. Feature Extraction
In the feature extraction phase, collected data is transformed into a dataset of channels with their selected set of features. For this to happen, groups of collected data within a sliding window are reduced based on the name of the channel (i.e., primary domain name). The resulted dataset format serves as the input for training, validation and classification. The features and their computation are described below.
1) Entropy:
The notion of entropy, or information density, can be interpreted as measuring the average uncertainty of a letter A n given {A 1 , .., A n−1 } [33] . Generally, entropy is computed over a discrete random variable X using the formula:
where Pr(x i ) is the probability of the i-th symbol of information (e.g., a character) in the series X composed of up to n symbols. Among other uses, entropy is widely used as a heuristic for the detection of encryption in a stream of bits [10] , [21] , [31] . Similarly, we apply a variant of this method to subdomains of each input primary domain to detect encrypted queries that are rarely observed in the DNS. The random variable X is a series of subdomains characters, and the allowed symbols are the letters, digits and hyphens (LDH) according to the definition of the DNS syntax. The feature is computed as follows:
2) IP-Hostname Exchange RR Type Distribution: As mentioned above (see II-A), the domain name system's resource records have types attached to them. According to [14] , 99.4% of the requested resource records are of the following types: Given the main function of DNS as the "phonebook for the Internet" [36] , it is reasonable that types of records used for the exchange of IP addresses and hostnames to serve as the vast majority of queries. However, these record types are restricted by to a short response length (i.e., up to the length of an IP address) compared to other RR types (e.g., TXT, SRV) and thus, the distribution of RR types may change. The feature we create computes the rate of A, AAAA, and PTR records for a domain-specific traffic.
3) Unique Query Ratio: A domain whose subdomains are used as messages is not likely to repeat them. Therefore, when comparing domains used for exfiltration to normal primary domains we expect to see a much higher unique query ratio for the latter.
4) Unique Query Volume:
In a normal setting, DNS traffic is rather sparse as responses are largely cached within the stub resolver. However, for the case of data exchange over the DNS, the domain-specific traffic is expected to avoid cache by nonrepeating messages, or short time-to-live in order for the data to make it to the attacker's server. Avoiding cache as well a lengthy data exchange, might result in a higher volume of requests compared to the normal setting.
5) Query Length Average:
As a complementary to the volume feature and given a query size limitation, there's a trade-off between the volume of queries and their length. We therefore, inspect both for anomalies. 6) Longest Meaningful Word Length Average: Each subdomain within the domain-specific traffic is decomposed to its substrings ordered by their length. Starting from the longest to the shortest substring, an English dictionary word lookup is performed over the current substring. If the lookup succeeds (i.e., the substring is a valid English word) -the length of the substring is taken as the longest meaningful word (LMW) length. Otherwise, the iteration continues to the next substring. In the case of lookup failure for all substrings, zero is returned. The feature is the average over the length of the domainspecific LMW lengths.
E. Covert Channel Detection
In this phase, each of the samples collected in the previous phases is classified as either a (1) covert or (2) non-covert channel.
To the best of our knowledge, less than nine known malware that exchange data over the DNS were detected in the last decade (see Section II-D). Moreover, most of these malware samples are not available. This lack of a sufficiently large sample space of possible attacks might limit a model ability to detect new types of attacks that are not captured within the currently available malware samples. Therefore, instead of applying supervised learning, we attempt to classify covert channels using anomaly detection techniques (one class classifiers) in which only the normal domain-specific traffic is used for training, and only new sample that does not conform to normal, expected behavior would be declared as covert.
In the evaluation phase (see Section VI) we consider two different one class classifier models and compare their performance.
The anomaly detection model for this phase is interchangeable and requires a standard interface that is trained on a single class and has a tunable contamination rate (an upper bound on errors in the training set).
The model receives channels and their features as input and outputs a binary class. This approach is unsupervised in nature as the training data is unlabeled.
F. Legitimate Channel Filtering
The algorithm outputs a set of primary domains whose features indicate an anomaly with regards to data exchange over the DNS behavior. As mentioned before, the remaining set of domains will contain both attack and non-attack use cases of data exchange. In order to separate the latter, we use heuristics that rely on several additional properties of the data: 1) Unique Client Count: By our examples of previously existing attacks (see Section II-D), we expect malicious data exchange to be either a part of a targeted attack on a small number of users, or the act of a single user in the case of DNS tunneling (see Figure 4 ). In addition, legitimate data exchange over the DNS is likely to be a part of a reputable service (as previously mentioned in II-C). For example: in our recursive DNS system logs, AV services that exchange data over the DNS (e.g., Sophos extensible list) had over 30 different clients within a three days time window. To avoid marking reputable services as malicious data exchange over the DNS, we suggest a filter based on the number of unique clients (i.e., IP addresses that accessed the primary domain). The suggested filter is expected to eliminate the vast majority of legitimate covert channels as at least 80% of the observed primary domains in our DNS logs had more than 10 clients within the time window of the last three days (see Figure 4 ). Fig. 4 . Less than 20% of observed primary domains had at most 10 users within the last three days. Applying the assumption of a limited number of users for attacks compared to a large number of users for legitimate covert channels, allows this filter to remove most of the latter.
2) HTTP Popularity Rank: We use both Alexa top sites [1] and Majestic Million report [2] lists of popular domains as a whitelist filtering. This is useful with popular domains with respect to Hyper-text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests but not necessarily with DNS requests (e.g., mcaffee.com legitimate covert channel use a subdomain of their highly popular primary domaina)
3) Non-Internet Primary Domains: We use IANA Root Zone Database [16] list of top-level domains to strike out internal top-level-domains used for routing. These are encountered frequently when searching for anomalies.
It's important to note that these legitimate channels can also be filtered prior to the anomaly detection phase. However, removing them from the training set may degrade results as data exchange trends may now be removed from the data.
V. FEATURE SELECTION
Previous works practiced anomaly detection, unsupervised, and supervised learning models for the purpose of detecting DNS tunneling. Numerous features were explored for that end and they are described thoroughly in Subsection V-A. However, when optimizing a method for both high throughput tunneling, as well as low throughput malware, some of the features may degrade the results of the solution. For example: several studies [6] , [9] suggested the mean time between queries to a specific domain as a significant feature for the detection of tunneling while in the case of low throughput malware it decreases the abnormality of samples as queries occur upon opportunity (e.g., credit card swipe) rather than as periodic, and dense keep-alive messages.
We use this observation to conduct a feature selection process in which the set of previously explored features, as well as genuine ones serve as candidates. Throughout the process we attempt to select the optimal subset of features such that the differences between the center of attack samples "strays" as far as possible from that of the non-attack samples (see Section V-B). Table III exhibits candidate features that appeared in previous studies, as well as genuine ones. Also on Table III , the features correspond to the attributes of data exchange over DNS (as appears in Figure 2 ), which attempts to make their relation to the problem of detection better understood. Each of the feature candidates packs within a wide set of statistic values, including: average, variance, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and raw value. The proposed feature selection method attempts to cover all candidates in order to select the optimal set of features for the detection phase. Unique query ratio Non-repeating Ratio of unique queries (see Subsection IV-D3) [35] Unique query volume High volume Number of unique queries (see Subsection IV-D4) [34] Query length High volume Query string length (see Subsection IV-D5) [7] , [35] NX ratio No answers Non-existing domain response ratio -
A. Candidate Features
Numeric characters ratio
Encoded/ encrypted
Ratio of numeric characters [7] Labels count Structured Number of label strings (between dots) [6] Longest label length Structured Longest number of characters in a substring [6] Inter-response space Density/ periodcitiy Time between consecutive responses to the domain [6] , [9] Response wait time Density Time between query and response [6] B. Feature Selection Technique
Our proposed technique for feature selection is based on maximizing the difference between the mean of attack, and non-attack samples within the selected feature space. Let x be a sample, n the number of features considered, and A an anomaly detection model that outputs a score:
The output of A(x) increases as the input sample, x, is more anomalous. Let ρ be a subset of features and x ρ be a restriction of x to the features in ρ. Let AT K be a set of attacks and AT K be a set of non-attack channels (i.e., domain-specific traffic). We output the following selected features:
On our experiments, A is set to be the one class SVM model with a radial basis function (RBF) kernel. Based on our data, this yielded a set of features described in Section V. By observing a principle component analysis (PCA) dimensionality reduction method (see Figure 5 ), and after restricting samples to our features set, one can observe that the difference between the mean anomaly score of attacks and non-attacks channels implies separability. Fig. 5 . Principle component analysis of selected features. Triangles stand for attacks and circles to non-attack domains. Since ρ, the subset of selected features, maximizes the mean distance between attacks and non-attacks it allows a better detection using a one-class classifier on non-attacks alone.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Setup
Our dataset contains a medium-scale recursive DNS data logs with six days of data, more than 10,000 users, and 5-8 million queries per hour (see Figure 6 ). The proposed method parameters are set as described in Table V.   TABLE V. PARAMETER SETTING 
B. Simulated Attacks
Given the fact that malware samples communicating over the DNS are not available, our evaluation is based on selfgenerated attacks in a similar way to related works but covers a broader set of attacks of different nature (see VI). 2) Low throughput malware: We used both Pisloader malware sample (see Section II-D2) together with its mock CNC available in [13] as well as a self-developed credit card exfiltration malware.
For pisloader, two configurations were attempted:
(a) Active C2 -Wekby / Pisloader is able to communicate with its C2. (b) Inactive C2 -Wekby / Pisloader attempts to connect but is unable to. It therefore tries to send each "start session" message three times.
For the credit-card malware, we used a credit-card generation Python code [12] with the following configurations:
(a) Attack rate -range between 15-100 credit cards per hour. [20] ) is a one class model that works under the assumption that compared to regular points, an anomaly point is easier to separate from the sample space compared to regular points. The model measures this "ease of separation" by generating a predetermined number of trees (called iTrees) such that each of their nodes splits the sample space based on a random feature and value within its range. For each tree, a sample "leaving" the iTree at a lower level is more likely to be anomalous. For each sample, the level in which it exists each iTree is averaged over the entire forest and the score is calculated as such:
where E(h(x)) is the average exit level, n is the maximal number of features per tree and c(n) is a normalizing factor for h(x). It therefore follows that:
By performing exhaustive search over the contamination ratio parameter (number of anomalies over the total number of points in training set), a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is produced (see Figure 7) . Fig. 7 . The iForest ROC curve implies that high throughput tunneling is detected with an extremely low false positive rate as well as the efficiency of the legitimate covert channel filtering phase.
2) One-class SVM:
The one class support vector machine (OCSVM) is a one class classifier inspired by the SVM classifier (see Scholkopf et. al [32] ). It is formulated to find a hyperplane that separates a desired portion of the training patterns from the origin of the feature space as follows: min w, ξi, ρ
. . , n and ξ i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n where φ(x i ) is a kernel function over the i-th sample, ξ i are slack variables (to allow a soft margin), w is a vector orthogonal to the hyperplane, n is the number of samples, and ρ represents the margin. The ν parameter characterizes an upper bound on the rate of outliers. We tried multiple kernels out of which RBF performed best. By performing an exhaustive search over different values of ν, an ROC curve is produced as in the previous model (see Figure 8 ) 3) OCSVM vs. iForest: While OCSVM displays a better ROC curve than iForest (see Figure 8 and Figure 7) , OCSVM tends to overfit when 1 ν exceeds the size of training set (see Figure 9 ). This comparison makes OCSVM a fitter model on a high sensitivity threat model. However, for low sensitivity (e.g., attempting to detect only DNS tunneling) an iForest model is less prone to a high false positive rates even when training data sizes may change over time.
4) Throughput Limitations:
Putting aside the high throughput tunneling, the class of low throughput malwares may include samples with less than a hundred bytes of data per day. Therefore, in order to acknowledge our limitations we compare our detection rates with respect to the throughput (measured by bytes per hour).
The class of low throughput malware displayed in Table II are expected to transfer more than a single kilobytes of data per hour and thus our method is capable of their detection. On top of that, the use of encoding of characters to fit the DNS syntax, as well as encryption to mask the data within the covert channel, may increases the payload up to eight times its raw size. For example: a credit-card number combined with its owner name, card verification value (CVV) and expiration date will take at least 50 bytes of data before encoding Fig. 9 . OCSVM tends to overfit as the contamination rate inverse, 1 ν , exceeds the size of the training set. and encryption, thus a malware will be forced to limit its throughput to less than two credit-cards per hour to avoid detection with at most 10% risk. Fig. 10 . The detection rate of our proposed method increases at a much larger rate than throughput. Current results allow us to claim that upon exfiltration of several credit-cards and/or passwords our model should be highly available of detecting the domain used for the attack.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we suggested a framework for the detection of data exfiltration over the DNS using only the DNS data. A key observation in this work is the distinction of exfiltration into two main types: high throughput DNS tunneling, and low throughput exfiltration malware. The techniques described in this work have been well-studied in past works; however, the focus was on the first type.
Our framework aims at mitigating the latter case of low throughput malware, such as credit card exfiltration. Due to the scarcity of such attacks, our framework is, at its core, an anomaly detection model combined with a rule-based falsepositive reduction phase whose value is reflected in our results. Our detection rates show that while high throughput DNS tunneling detection is an easy problem, low throughput attacks have their price and may require a larger amount of false positives (10%) to handle completely. The framework's results improve with throughput and becomes highly effective after the exfiltration of 1kb/h which is less than twenty encrypted and encoded credit cards details.
By Taking into account primary domains as candidates for detection, our framework possesses two more advantages: 1) upon detection, tracking down the machine in charge of exfiltrating the data is straightforward, as you have the IPs approaching the primary domains; 2) data structure is simple and allows easy aggregation (compared to models that inspect sequences of queries and responses)
On the other hand, the main disadvantage is loss of generality especially with regards to distributed attacks. An attacker may choose to distribute its payload among different primary domains and name servers. In this manner she can lower the anomaly of all primary domains in use almost without limitation. It's important to say that it's unclear that using a generalized method of traffic summary will pose a solution.
Another point for discussion involves the importance of the legit channels removal phase. There are various techniques to reduce the number of false positives and they are highly dependent on the assumption that the attack is targeted. However, if the attack uses a compromised domain it inherits its popularity. We haven't come across such attacks but this is an issue for further research.
We therefore think future work should deal with the ability to lower false positive rates on the second phase while avoiding loss of generality for distributed attacks. A possible path is to explore an algorithm that will consider nameservers as channels rather than primary domains. This will allow classification of malice by the receiving point of the data rather than the sending one which is more valuable when discussing exfiltraiton. However, this is a more complicated method since correlating the domains to the actual nameserver queried requires additional sensors which are not typically handled by network owners. Also while this is also possible to distribute, it is much harder for an attacker to manage multiple nameservers rather than to manage multiple primary domains.
